Can a homeowner stop paying for utilities or cancel them when someone else occupies their property? This is one of the most common questions, and until now, the answer hasn’t been entirely consistent.
The Provincial Courts had maintained different criteria, but the Supreme Court has established a criterion that will serve as a reference in the coming years in Judgment No. 426/2026, of June 24 .
The resolution specifies that, when the occupant of a dwelling lacks a title that legitimizes their stay, the termination or interruption of supplies will not, as a general rule, constitute a crime of coercion.
What has the Supreme Court said about cutting off electricity to a squatter?
The Plenary has decided to unify the doctrine around article 172 of the Penal Code after noting that the different courts had been offering different answers to similar situations and the conclusion is clear: when the occupant does not have a right that legitimizes his possession, the cutting off of supplies does not , in itself, constitute a crime of coercion .
The Second Chamber considers that the legal system cannot impose on the owner the obligation to finance services used by someone residing illegitimately, since maintaining that obligation would mean transferring an unjustified economic burden to him .
However, the Supreme Court avoids establishing an absolute rule, insisting that each case must be analyzed individually, since the criminal response will depend on the legal status of whoever remains in the home.
The case analyzed by the Supreme Court was not an illegal occupation.
Interestingly, this ruling did not stem from a squatting case, but rather from a divorce proceeding . One of the spouses, the holder of the electricity supply contract for the family home, requested the service be disconnected while the other continued to reside there until the court resolved the issues regarding its use. As a result, the property remained without electricity for several days.
The Vigo Criminal Court No. 3 ruled that this action constituted the crime of coercion . The Pontevedra Provincial Court subsequently upheld the nine-month prison sentence , and the Supreme Court has finally ratified this decision, dismissing the appeal.
Why the Supreme Court excludes the crime of coercion in squatting cases
As we have already mentioned, although this issue was not the subject of the appeal, the Court dedicates a large part of its reasoning to explaining what the criminal response should be when the dwelling is occupied by people who lack a title to remain in it.
The high court bases its conclusion on the fact that the legal system does not impose on the owner the obligation to maintain supplies for the benefit of someone who occupies the property without the right to do so.
According to the Supreme Court, the law cannot force the owner to preserve electricity, water or gas for the benefit of those who accessed his home illegally, since this would mean that the unlawful act of occupation would be compounded by the benefit of enjoying these services , generating unjust enrichment .
When can cutting off supplies be a crime?
The answer changes when the person affected by the termination has the right to remain in the property, as was the case here. The Criminal Chamber considers it proven that the purpose of terminating the contract was to pressure the other spouse to leavethe home before it was decided who was entitled to its use.
For this reason, the high court understands that the conduct fits into the so-called vis in rebus , a form of violence against things that is used to pressure another person and limit their freedom of decision.
The ruling adds that, from the perspective of the crime of coercion, it is irrelevant whether the supply was interrupted through physical manipulation or a request for cancellation . The determining factor is that both actions produce the same coercive effect when used to deprive the occupant of an essential service.
The key is whether or not the person occupying the dwelling has the right to do so.
The court made it clear that the justice system does not treat squatters the same as tenants or ex-partners : the key lies in the legitimacy of possession . In cases of illegal occupation, the owner is not obligated to maintain, at their own expense, the utilities used by someone who lacks legal right to remain in the property. If the occupant entered illegally, the owner is not required to finance their stay .
The situation is different for so-called “squatters .” Even if the tenant isn’t paying rent, their entry was based on a lease agreement . Precisely because a right exists (even if it’s under dispute or pending legal resolution), the landlord cannot use cutting off utilities to achieve eviction , as the conflict must be resolved through the established legal channels.
In the case analyzed, the conclusion is that the husband cut off the electricity to force his wife to leave the home . The Supreme Court confirms that, although he was the formal holder of the contract, the supply was intended for the use of the family home and could not be used as a means of coercionwhile the dispute over the property remained unresolved.
With this decision, the high court provides legal certainty : when there is a contract or any other right that legitimizes the stay in the home, the utilities cannot be used as a bargaining chip ; on the other hand, when the occupant lacks a legitimate title, the owner may be exempt, in general, from the obligation to continue acting as the “patron” of the one who illegally occupies his home.
The dissenting opinion: four judges disagree with the majority opinion
However, we must point out that the ruling is not unanimous, since four of the fourteen judges on the panel have issued a dissenting opinion expressing their concern about what they call a “progressive dematerialization of the concept of violence.”
In his opinion, the resolution excessively expands the limits of article 172, equating a mere procedure with acts of real physical force on things, such as unhooking the windows or door of a house or shooting the tires of a vehicle to force the driver to stop.
In their statement, the dissenting judges raise doubts about the proportionality and logic of the sentence: Does someone who cancels a contract they hold after six months of paying the cost truly constitute typical violence? They question whether such behavior can warrant a nine-month prison sentence and be labeled, without further qualification, as an act of violence against women.
The judges wonder where criminal intervention will stop: if today there is a conviction for supplying electricity, will it also be a crime to disconnect Wi-Fi, under the argument that it violates the fundamental right of article 20 of the Spanish Constitution to receive information and express opinions?
The dissenting opinion also questions whether the non-payment of installments on a vehicle loan or leasewill be considered typical violence in the future . They warn that, under the logic of the ruling, this could be interpreted as coercion by disrupting the user’s right to freedom of movement.
The judges warn that such an expansive interpretation threatens to cause a kind of hypertrophy of “crime by coercion” , turning this crime into a real catch-all where family conflicts, although reprehensible, that should be resolved in civil jurisdiction end up being deposited.
Article found in Idealista blog www. Idealista.com
